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Abstract
We present a microeconomic model of social stratication, which includes an endogenous
fertility component. In the model, egalitarian and stratied societies coexist. The latter are
divided into two hereditary classes: a warrior elite and a productive class. The model entails
that the extra cost warriors must incur to train and equip their children for war determines
the relative sizes of both classes and the degree of economic inequality. Higher costs of warrior
children imply a greater economic advantage for warriors and a smaller ratio of warriors to pro-
ducers. These results are consistent with the historical evidence. Finally, we explore conditions
under which the social contributions of the warrior elite could discourage a revolution.
Keywords: Social stratication; income inequality; warfare; military participation ratio.
1 Introduction
Most anthropological and sociological theories of social stratication in premodern societies share
three recurrent themes. First, premodern stratied societies divide labour between warriors, who
ght wars, and peasants, who work the land. Second, stratied societies must be able to produce
a sizable food surplus (i.e., more food than is needed to feed the peasants and their families) in
order to support a non-food-producing warrior elite. Third, social positions in premodern stratied
societies are, for the most part, hereditary (Summers 2005).
We integrate these three themes into a microeconomic model of social stratication, which in-
cludes an endogenous fertility component. Unlike previous studies, we base our model on individual
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rational choice, rather than treating social classes as organic units. We recognise that institutions,
such as hereditary nobility, constrain individual behavior. But we also recognise that, within the
constraints imposed by institutions, each individual will pursue his own interest by using the means
at his disposal.
Using our model, we study the e¤ects of production technology, military technology, and the
costs of weapons and military training on the class structure of premodern stratied societies. We
focus on two main issues: what determines the class composition of a stratied society and what
determines the degree of economic privilege of its upper classes. While explaining the emergence
of stratication is beyond the scope of our model, we explore conditions under which the military
and organisational services provided by the elite could discourage a lower class revolution.
Below we present a brief sketch of the model and we summarise its results.
A group of rival societies divide up a region according to the balance of military power. These
societies may be egalitarian or stratied.
In an egalitarian society there are no social classes. All of its members are food producers. They
hunt and gather or cultivate their own plots of land. They also serve in the local militia. Military
duties do not interfere with food production.
In a stratied society there are two hereditary social classes: a warrior elite and a productive
class. The warriors own the land, while the producers cultivate the land to produce the food
necessary to sustain both social classes. The classes divide up the crop in predetermined shares.
There are diminishing returns to labour in food production. Hence, per capita incomes in units of
food are decreasing in the size of the productive class.
The warrior elite performs two social functions. First, it provides public goods that enhance
the productivity of the land (e.g., the warriors could organise the construction and maintenance of
large-scale irrigation systems). Second, the warriors ght in wars, using specialised weapons that
only they can handle. Due to the e¤ectiveness of the specialised weapons, an army of professional
warriors is more powerful than a militia of equal size.
Fertility is an individual choice: each adult chooses how many children to have, given his income
and the cost of children. These are more costly for warriors than for producers. The cost di¤erence
between warrior and producer children can be read as the extra cost that warriors must incur to
train and equip their children for war (OConnell 2002, 42; Prestwich 1996; 1968, 58). Demographic
equilibrium is reached when warriors and peasants decide to reproduce at their replacement rates,
given their incomes and the costs of warrior and producer children.
The equilibrium results of the model are the following.
In egalitarian societies, the producersper capita income is increasing in the cost of producer
children, and is not a¤ected by changes in total factor productivity (TFP). Any increase in TFP
will be o¤set over time by population growth.
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In stratied societies, warriors earn higher per capita incomes than producers. This result is
entirely due to demographic pressures: the warriors earn higher incomes than peasants because
warrior children are more costly than producer children.
The sharecropping agreement between the social classes does not a¤ect the equilibrium per
capita incomes. If the producers get a raise in their share, producer population will grow and
warrior population will decline until the per capita incomes of both classes return to their original
levels. In the model, the share of the product taken by the warrior elite does not have a permanent
impact on income inequality.
The producersper capita income is the same in egalitarian and in stratied societies. This
means that any distributive gains that the producers may obtain from the abolition of social classes
will inevitably vanish in the long term, as a consequence of population growth.
The warriorsper capita income is increasing in the cost of warrior children, while the producers
per capita income is increasing in the cost of producer children. Per capita incomes are not a¤ected
by changes in TFP. As in the case of egalitarian societies, any increase in TFP will be o¤set over
time by population growth.
Following Andreski (1968) we dene a societys military participation ratio (MPR) as follows:
MPR =
Number of warriors
Number of peasants
:
The model implies that the MPR is increasing in the warriors share of the crop. On the other
hand, an increase in the relative cost of warrior children will reduce the MPR and at the same time
will sharpen income inequality in favour of warriors. This result is consistent with the historical
evidence surveyed by Andreski: increases in the cost of weapons and military training tend to
reduce the MPR and to increase the economic advantage of warriors (Andreski 1968, 4041, 73).
In the remainder of this introduction we survey the sociological, anthropological and economic
theories of social stratication, and we present the main empirical regularities. We also cover the
basics of Malthusian population theory.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our model in detail. In
Section 3 we derive the demographic equilibrium of the model. We also discuss its implications, and
compare them with the available historical evidence. Finally, in Section 4 we make some concluding
remarks.
1.1 Agriculture and social stratication
Ethnographic studies reveal that most contemporary bands of hunter-gatherers, such as the Kung in
the Kalahari or the Yolngu in Arnhem Land, are egalitarian and devoid of leadership (Boehm 1999;
Knauft 1994; Winterhalder 2001). We do not know how prehistoric hunter-gatherers organised
themselves, but the observation of their contemporary remnants and the archaeological evidence
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indicate that most prehistoric hunter-gatherers lacked social stratication. Many agrarian societies,
on the contrary, were socially stratied (e.g., Sumer, Ancient Egypt and Mycenaean Greece). This
fact suggests that agriculture and social stratication are related in some way (Price and Gebauer
1995).
The ability to produce a surplus of food lies at the core of many theories of social stratica-
tion. The conventional argument runs as follows. Surplus food is required to support a non-food-
producing upper class. Agriculture has the potential to yield a surplus and hence the potential to
support a class of non-food-producers. Hunter-gatherers, on the other hand, are always living on
the edge of subsistence: chronically undernourished and constantly threatened by famine [evidence
of this is surveyed by Kaplan (2000)]. They are thus unable to a¤ord a class of non-food-producers.
Gordon Childe (1942, 18; 1954) is the foremost surplus theorist of social stratication. Unsurpris-
ingly, his ideas are very popular among Marxist thinkers (e.g., Beaucage 1976, 409410; Mandel
1962, 26, 43).
Surplus theories of social stratication have several critics. Pearson (1957), for instance, argues
that all societies have the potential to produce food in excess of biological necessity. According to
Pearson, it is social organisation that generates a surplus and not the other way around. Sahlins
(1972/1998) maintains that the key precondition for social stratication is not the ability to produce
surplus food, but the feasibility of food storage [see Cashdan (1980) and Hayden (1995)]. Without
storage, Sahlins argues, there is no accumulation of wealth, and without wealth, social inequalities
cannot exist. Most hunter-gatherers are nomads. As they quickly deplete local resources, they
have no alternative but to keep moving. Nomadism makes storing food, and thus stratication,
impossible.
The reported cases of stratied hunter-gatherer communities are located in exceptionally favourable
ecological niches; for example, in rich marine and aquatic habitats (Erlandson 2001; Kennett 2005;
Pálsson 1988; So¤er 1985; So¤er 1989; Testart 1982; Vanhaeren and dErrico. 2005; Yesner 1980).
In line with Sahlinshypothesis, stratication among hunter-gatherers was particularly common in
places where the abundance of food allows for permanent settlement and food storage. The Pomo
people of Central California are a classic example of a stratied gathering society. Acorns, the
staple of the Pomo diet before modernisation, were only available during one month in autumn.
During that month the Pomo gathered the acorns and stored them for the rest of the year. The
acorn stores were controlled by the chiefs (Kni¤en 1939).
Whatever the preconditions for stratication may be (surplus, storage, or both), the emergence
of an upper class of non-food-producers remains to be explained. Two opposing explanations have
been proposed: a conict-based explanation, advanced by Fried (1967; see also Hayden 1995), and
a functionalist explanation, attributed to Service (1962; also found in Davis 1949, 367). Conict
theorists hold that aggrandisers seized control of the means of production and then used the
surplus to obtain a superior standard of living. This is the spirit of Acemoglu and Robinsons
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(2001) economic theory of political transitions. The functionalists, on the other hand, believe that
the upper classes provide goods that benet society as a whole: they lead war parties and organise
defence, build and maintain irrigation systems, store food as famine relief and manage intergroup
trade. As a reward for their services, the lower classes allow the upper classes a greater share of
societys wealth. Cio¢ -Revilla (2005) presents a simulation model of functionalist inspiration.
Intermediate positions have emerged between these extremes. For instance, Johnson and Earle
(2000) maintain that the intensication of agriculture and consequent population growth pose a
number of problems that can only be solved through hierarchy and the centralisation of power:
resource competition leading to raids and warfare, the risk of failure in food production, ine¢ cient
use of resources that call for major technology investments and resource deciencies that can only
be made up by foreign trade (pp. 2932). Once power is acquired by an upper class, that group
uses its power to establish privileges for itself (pp. 266277, 301303). At the same time, the lower
classes face a trade-o¤between the benets they derive from the public goods provided by the upper
classes and the burden of inequality net of the cost of revolting (Boone 1992). Grossman (2002) and
Leeson (2006) develop microeconomic models along these lines. Baker et al. (2010) complement the
microeconomic analysis with Malthusian principles.
1.2 The rise of an hereditary warrior elite
According to Andreski (1968, 3132), a class of warriors can emerge in two ways: either by gradual
di¤erentiation of warriors from the rest of the population, or by conquest and subjugation of another
group. Gradual di¤erentiation occurs when a group manages to monopolise arms-bearing in order
to secure a privileged position in society or if the professionalisation of warriors is necessary for
society to augment its military power. Andreski maintains that conquest was the most common
mechanism of social stratication and provides a long list of historical cases to back up his claim: the
subjugation of one city by another in Sumer (p. 42), the Dorian invasions in Greece (p. 4344), and
the Norse conquest of Russian Slavic tribes (p. 62), to mention just a few. Perhaps the chemically
purest examples of stratication by conquest can be found in East Africa and Sudan. In those
regions, ample kingdoms were founded through the conquest of agriculturalists by pastoralists (p.
32). In Ankole, for instance, the pastoralist Hima conquered the agricultural Iru sometime before
the British colonisation. The Hima forced the Iru to pay tribute and allowed them no political
rights. Only Iru men were allowed to bear arms and participate in war.
To explain the emergence of slavery, Lagerlöf (2009) proposes a microeconomic model with
Malthusian foundations. In his model, an external elite forms a military alliance with an internal
elite. Together they seize ownership of the land and enslave the commoners.
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1.3 Social mobility
Betzig (1986) and Summers (2005) argue that the members of the upper classes use their privileged
access to resources in order to further their own reproduction and that of their relatives. However,
if this reproductive skewis too extreme, it may eventually cause society to collapse. The lower
classes may no longer be able to support the demands placed upon them by the mushrooming
upper classes, and the latter may fragment as their members scrabble for an ever smaller share of
the available food surplus.
The need to preserve a stable class composition puts limits on the extent to which the upper
classes can outbreed the lower classes. There are various ways in which a stable class composition
can be maintained. The members of the upper classes may voluntarily have fewer children, perhaps
in response to their impoverishment as they become too numerous; or some upper-class individuals
may become celibate and not reproduce at all; or enough of them may be killed in war before they
get an opportunity to reproduce. All of these mechanisms help reduce the degree of reproductive
skew. Some cultures have devised quite ingenious practices to restrain the growth of their upper
classes. For instance, a newly appointed Ottoman sultan was obliged by law to kill all of his
brothers. In the Central African kingdoms of Ankole and Kitara, the sons of a dead king had to
ght for the throne until only one of them was left alive (Andreski 1968, 19).
The high reproduction rate of the upper classes can also be o¤set by inducing their excess
members to leave. This may be achieved by some social rule, such as primogeniture, by virtue of
which the eldest son inherits the whole family estate. The disinherited sons may sink down into
the lower classes or be forced to seek their fortunes elsewhere. For example, the descendents of the
king of Siam, except for his successors, were lowered in rank after each generation. After the fth
they became commoners (p. 19). In medieval Europe, noble scions roaming the country in search
of efs were a common sight. This surplus of nobles was the principal source of knights for the
Crusades (p. 137). The Austranesian stress on primogeniture forced the chiefsyounger sons to nd
and colonise uninhabited islands (Finney 1996).
Note that the permanent inow of dispossessed aristocrats requires members of the lower classes
to reproduce below the replacement rate (Eberhard 1962, 264265; Lenski 1984, 190). Otherwise,
the lower classes would grow beyond the point where they can provide for subsistence, and society
would starve to death.
1.4 Malthusian principles of social stratication
To the extent that the adoption of agriculture involves the development of a more costly military
technology and the emergence of a class of specialist warriors, not all of the extra output produced
by agriculture can be translated into support for more producers and their families. A fraction
of total production must be used to maintain and equip the warrior elite. This point was made
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by Sauvy (1969), who argued that achieving a power optimumrequires maximising the surplus
available to support the military and the government.
The size and quality of the professional army that a society can support depends on the size
of the surplus that the society can generate. In turn, the size of the surplus depends on three
factors: the number of workers, the productivity of the average worker and the amount consumed
by the average worker and his dependents. From Malthus onward, there has been a lively debate
on the interplay between these factors (Coleman and Schoeld 1986; Ashraf and Galor 2008).
The classical tradition, exemplied by Malthus and Ricardo, assumed a perfectly elastic supply
of labouring population at a constant subsistence wage rate together with diminishing returns to
labour. If wages rise above subsistence, the labouring population will expand, leading to more
employment. That will force down the marginal product of labour and thus wages. This process
will only come to a halt when the marginal product of labour equals the subsistence wage, at
which point the labouring population will stop growing. This is also the point at which the surplus
product, in the form of rent, will be maximised.
How can population be regulated so as to generate a surplus in view of the limits set by technol-
ogy and the environment? The growth of the population within a given territory is determined by
a combination of fertility, mortality and migration, the relative importances of which have varied
widely across time and geography. The role of migration is obvious and uncontroversial, so we shall
focus on the other factors.
The original Malthusian theory assumed that population is automatically regulated through
some kind of homeostatic mechanism. If the population gets too large relative to the amount of
available resources, malnutrition, famine, disease and warfare will cause premature deaths. This
formulation is based on the biological analogy that an animal species will blindly multiply up to
the limits set by the carrying capacity of its habitat. Other formulations rely on conscious choice or
social convention to limit the population. In his later writings, Malthus himself suggested prudential
restraint involving late marriage or celibacy (Malthus 1820, 248252). Abortion, infanticide and
prolonged breast-feeding may also serve to space out births or get rid of unwanted children. All
of these social practices were common among premodern societies (Douglas 1966; Cashdan 1985;
Macfarlane 1997). Some practices were deliberately designed to limit the population, whereas others
were followed without any such objective in mind. However, even non-deliberate social practices
may have a homeostatic e¤ect. Societies compete with each other and those with practices that
most e¤ectively regulate their populations may triumph over their rivals. Thus, group selection
may lead to the emergence of population control practices that are well adapted to the prevailing
environment (Wrigley 1978).
A controversial notion that needs to be claried at this point is that of subsistence consumption.
Some versions of the Malthusian theory interpret this notion in biological terms, equating it to the
minimum food intake that allows a human being to survive and produce an average of one o¤spring
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(e.g., Wolf 1966, 6). The later Malthus regarded such an idea as simplistic, and stressed the inuence
of socially conditioned preferences on reproductive behaviour (Malthus 1820, 248252; Costabile
and Rowthorn 1985). This was a common view among classical economists, such as Ricardo (1821,
91).
2 Model setup
2.1 Social structure
A region is populated by M  0 competing societies. These are divided into Me  0 egalitarian
societies and Ms  0 stratied societies, where Me + Ms = M and M > 0. Me and Ms are
exogenous parameters.
The societies are indexed by i 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg. Society i is composed of Ni > 0 adults. The
adults are divided into Nwi  0 warriors and Npi > 0 food producers, where Ni = Nwi +Npi. Nwi
and Npi are endogenous variables.
If Nwi = 0, we say the society is egalitarian. If Nwi > 0, we say the society is stratied. In a
stratied society, social positions are hereditary: the children of warriors become warriors, and the
children of producers become producers.
2.2 Military power and land holding
If Society i is egalitarian, a non-professional militia defends the society and its military power is
proportional to the number of producers. If Society i is stratied, only warriors carry arms and the
military power of the society is proportional to the number of warriors. Let Pi represent Society
is military power. We dene Pi as follows:
Pi =
8<: N

pi if Nwi = 0;
(Nwi)
 if Nwi > 0:
(1)
The parameter  > 1 represents the relative e¤ectiveness of a specialised military technology that
only professional warriors can handle, and the parameter  measures the e¤ectiveness of military
power in acquiring or defending land. There are decreasing returns to military power, which means
that  2 (0; 1). To simplify the analysis, equation (1) assumes that in stratied societies the
producers do not participate in war, or play an insignicant role. This was often the case in
premodern times (Gat 2006, 298299).
The total area of available land is given by the parameter L0 > 0. The balance of military
power determines the distribution of land among the M societies. Let Li be the area controlled by
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Society i. We dene Li as follows:
Li =
PiL0PM
k=1 Pk
: (2)
This expression implies that the more powerful societies will get the larger shares of the land.
Equation (2) can be rewritten in the following manner:
Li =
PiL0
Pi + P i
; (3)
where
P i =
MX
i=1
Pi   Pi. (4)
P i represents the combined military power of all societies with the exception of Society i.
2.3 Food production and allocation
The food production of Society i is given by
Yi = AiL

i N
1 
pi ; (5)
where  2 (0; 1) is a parameter that measures the intensiveness of land in production, and Ai > 0 is
a variable that represents the societys total factor productivity (TFP).1 We assume that stratied
societies are at least as and possibly more technologically advanced than egalitarian societies:
Ai =
8<: Ae if Nwi = 0;
As if Nwi > 0;
(6)
where Ae and As are constants, and Ae  As.
If Society i is egalitarian, the producers own the crop, which amounts to a total of Yi. If Society
i is stratied, the warriors take a predetermined share  2 (0; 1) of the crop and the producers
keep the rest. That is, the warrior elite gets a total of Yi and the productive class gets a total of
(1  )Yi: Sharecropping agreements such as this were frequent among premodern agriculturalists
(Raper and Reid 1941, 3536). Often, the landlords share was 50% of the crop, although shares
between one third and to two thirds of the crop were frequent. Typically, the crop was divided
into portions determined by tradition, rather than the market. The Spanish mediería, the Italian
mezzadria, the French métayage and the Catalan masovería are notable examples of sharecropping
1More generally, Yi represents the amalgamation of goods produced by society.
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contracts. Nowadays, sharecropping is an infrequent but still relevant practice, especially in poor
areas such as India and Pakistan.2
Not all people live long enough to reproduce. The parameters w; p 2 (0; 1] represent the
probabilities of reaching reproductive age, for warriors and producers. There is some evidence that,
before modern times, warriors had a lesser chance than producers of reaching reproductive age.
Gri¢ th (1970, 26) a¢ rms that one third of Norwegian kings died in battle during the Viking era.
According to Wrigley (1997, 206), the life expectancy at birth among the English aristocracy lagged
behind that of the population as a whole until the 18th century, among other reasons, because the
children of aristocrats were weaned earlier than the children of commoners. Hollingsworth (1957)
reports that, during the 14th and 15th centuries, 46% of the sons of English dukes died violent
deaths. The peasants, on the other hand, were free from the hazards of continual combat (although
they were occasionally prey to marauding lords). Because these examples may not be typical, we
make no assumption about the relative magnitudes of w and p.
Once the crop has been divided between the warrior elite and the productive class, each class
distributes its share among its members. Since only wNwi warriors and pNpi producers survive,
the per capita incomes of the surviving warriors and producers are given by
ywi =
Yi
wNwi
; (7)
ypi =
8>>><>>>:
Yi
pNpi
if Nwi = 0;
(1  )Yi
pNpi
if Nwi > 0:
(8)
Combining equations (7) and (8) with equation (5) we can reformulate the per capita incomes as
follows:
ywi =
AiL

i N
1 
pi
wNwi
; (9)
ypi =
8>>>><>>>>:
AiL

i N
1 
pi
pNpi
if Nwi = 0;
(1  )AiLi N1 pi
pNpi
if Nwi > 0:
(10)
2Bardhan and colleagues (2000) analyse sharecropping agreements from the perspective of contract theory.
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2.4 Consumption, reproduction and utility
The utility of an adult who survives to reproduce is given by
u =
cn1 
 (1  )1 
; (11)
where c  0 is his food consumption and n  0 is the number of his children.3 The adult chooses
the values of c and n. The parameter  2 (0; 1) represents the weight of consumption in utility.
We assume that adults who die before reproducing do not consume. Taking into account the
risk of premature death, a persons utility at birth is
u = u =
cn1 
 (1  )1 
; (12)
where  2 (0; 1] is the probability of surviving to reproduce, and  > 1 is a measure of death
aversion.
Historical evidence suggests that fertility among premodern peoples depended on the income
available to them. The methods they used to limit the number of their children included absti-
nence, celibacy, prolonged breast-feeding, abortion and infanticide (Douglas 1966; Cashdan 1985;
Macfarlane 1997). Recourse to such methods was more frequent when times were hard than in
times of abundance. To capture the link between consumption, fertility and income we will assume
that each surviving adult solves
max
fc;ng
u =
cn1 
 (1  )1 
s.t. c+ n = y;
c; n > 0;
where y is a variable that represents the surviving adults income, and  > 0 is the exogenous cost
of a child in units of food.
3Consumption need not consist solely of food. Both warriors and producers may use part of their incomes to
purchase other goods (e.g., clothes, weapons). We do not explore this issue and assume that all goods enter into the
utility function in terms of their food equivalent.
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The solution to the surviving adults problem is given by
c = y; (13)
n =
(1  ) y

; (14)
u =
y
1 
: (15)
Note that the expenditures on consumption and children are constant fractions of income, and
indirect utility is increasing in food income and decreasing in the cost of children. This is the
standard result of the consumer problem with a Cobb-Douglas utility function.
Children are more costly for warriors than for producers, which implies that w is greater than
p. This di¤erence can be read as the extra cost that warriors face in order to train and equip their
children for war. As an example, consider the case of Spartans, who were taken away from their
mothers to start their military training as young as seven years old (OConnell 2002, 42). Another
example is given by Prestwich (1996), who reports that a complete suit of armour in the Middle
Ages would cost the equivalent of a 1939 light tank. According to Andreski (1968, 58), the total
cost of equipping one knight amounted to the annual income of a whole village, making knighthood
a heavy nancial burden.
2.5 Population dynamics
There is no migration and no mobility between social classes. Therefore, population dynamics are
governed by the following laws of motion:
N 0wi = wnwiNwi| {z };
Children of
surviving warriors
(16)
N 0pi = pnpiNpi| {z };
Children of
surviving producers
(17)
where N 0wi and N
0
pi are the warrior and producer populations in the next generation. Recall that
survival probabilities w and p are parameters. This implies that any changes in population must
come about through endogenous variations in the birth rates, nwi and npi.
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3 Equilibrium and comparative statics
This section characterises the equilibrium of the model, and presents its comparative statics. We
analyse separately the equilibrium in egalitarian and stratied societies. In the case of stratied
societies, we investigate the determinants of income inequality, the relative sizes of the two social
classes, social privileges and the potential benets of social stratication.
3.1 Demographic equilibrium within egalitarian societies
Suppose that Society i is egalitarian. This means that Nwi = 0 and Ai = Ae. Also suppose that
Society i has reached its demographic equilibrium; that is,
N 0pi = Npi: (18)
Replacing this condition into equation (17), we get the producersreplacement fertility rate:
npi = 
 1
p : (19)
Since p 2 (0; 1], the producersreplacement fertility rate is at least one, for the following reason.
In equilibrium, the producers must have one child on average. Otherwise, their population would
not be stable. Since a fraction 1  p of the producers does not survive to reproduce, the surviving
producers must compensate by having more than one child.
Combining equation (14) with identity (19), we can calculate the equilibrium income of surviving
producers:
ypi =
 1p p
1   : (20)
Observe in equation (20) that the equilibrium income of surviving producers is increasing in
the replacement fertility rate and in the cost of producer children. Intuitively, if the replacement
rate or the cost of producer children increases, the typical producer will have to spend more to
maintain his fertility at the replacement rate. He will not be willing to increase his spending unless
his income also increases. This increase will be achieved through a temporary reduction in fertility
and subsequent population decline, which will increase labour productivity and thus the producers
income.
Also observe that the equilibrium income of surviving producers is not a¤ected by changes in
TFP, for the following reason. In the equilibrium, the typical producer must choose to reproduce at
the replacement rate. This choice depends exclusively on the producers preferences, on his income
and on the cost of producer children. Since the producers preferences and the cost of producer
children are xed, his income must adjust to persuade him to reproduce at the replacement rate.
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This is achieved through a standard Malthusian-Ricardian process: any increase in TFP will be
o¤set over time by population growth.
Using equations (1), (3), (10) and (20) we obtain implicit solutions for the equilibrium producer
population and for the land area of the egalitarian society:
Npi =
(1  )AiLi N1 pi
p
; (21)
Li =
NpiL0
Npi + P i
; (22)
where Ai = Ae.
It follows from equations (21) and (22) that TFP growth within an egalitarian society causes
producer population to grow and also expands the land area of this society at the expense of other
societies. This can be conrmed by log-di¤erentiating equations (21) and (22) with respect to Ai,
and then solving the resulting linear system for the elasticities:
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
=
L0
 [(1  )L0 + Li] ; (23)
@ lnLi
@ lnAi
=
 (L0   Li)
 [(1  )L0 + Li] : (24)
Since  > 0,  2 (0; 1), and L0 > Li > 0, both elasticities are positive. The mathematical
derivations are presented in Appendix A.1.
3.2 Demographic equilibrium within stratied societies
Suppose that Society j is stratied. This means that Nwj > 0 and Aj = As. Also suppose that
Society j has reached its demographic equilibrium; that is,
N 0wj = Nwj ; (25)
N 0pj = Npj : (26)
Replacing these condition into equations (16) and (17), we get the warriorsand the producers
replacement fertility rates:
nwj = 
 1
w ; (27)
npj = 
 1
p : (28)
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Since w; p 2 (0; 1], both replacement rates are equal or larger than one.
Combining equation (14) with identities (27) and (28), we can calculate the equilibrium incomes
of surviving warriors and producers:
ywj =
 1w w
1   ; (29)
ypj =
 1p p
1   : (30)
Observe that the equilibrium income of surviving warriors is increasing in their replacement
fertility rate and in the cost of warrior children. Analogously, the equilibrium income of surviving
producers is increasing in their replacement fertility rate and in the cost of producer children. As
in the case of egalitarian societies, these results arise from the combination of individual fertility
choices and the Malthusian population dynamics.
Also observe that the equilibrium incomes are not a¤ected by TFP. Any increase in TFP will
be o¤set over time by population growth.
Finally, note that the equilibrium income of producers is the same in egalitarian and in stratied
societies [compare equations (20) and (30)]. This is necessary for the producers of both types of
societies to reproduce at the replacement rate.
Using equations (1), (3), (9), (10), (29) and (30) we obtain implicit solutions for the equilibrium
populations of warriors and producers, and for the land area of the stratied society:
Nwj =
(1  ) AjLjN1 pj
w
; (31)
Npj =
(1  ) (1  )AjLjN1 pj
p
; (32)
Lj =
(Nwj)

L0
(Nwj)

+ P j
: (33)
where Aj = As.
It follows from equations (31)(33) that TFP growth within a stratied society causes producer
and warrior populations to grow and also expands the land area of this society at the expense of
other societies. This can be conrmed by log-di¤erentiating equations (31)(33) with respect to
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Aj , and then solving the resulting linear system for the elasticities:
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
=
L0
 [(1  )L0 + Lj ] ; (34)
@ lnNpj
@ lnAj
=
L0
 [(1  )L0 + Lj ] (35)
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
=
 (L0   Lj)
 [(1  )L0 + Lj ] : (36)
Since  > 0,  2 (0; 1), and L0 > Lj > 0, the three elasticities are positive. The mathematical
derivations are presented in Appendix A.2.
The military power of a representative stratied society is given by Nwj , while the military
power of a representative egalitarian society is simply Npj . If the following condition is met,
stratied societies will be more powerful than egalitarian societies:
 (1  )1  As
Ae
>

w
p

: (37)
Therefore, stratied societies will be more powerful than egalitarian societies if specialised weapons
are very e¤ective, or if warriors are relatively cheap, or if the warriorsshare of the crop is close to
. A full derivation of condition (37) is provided in Appendix A.3.
3.2.1 Income inequality and military participation ratio
The expected incomes of warriors and producers are given by the following expressions:
ywj = wywj + (1  w)  0; (38)
ypj = pypj + (1  p)  0; (39)
Replacing the equilibrium values of ywj and ypj , given equations (29) and (30), into equations (38)
and (39) we get
ywj =
w
1   ; (40)
ypj =
p
1   : (41)
Since w > p, it is direct that yws > yps. That is, in the equilibrium, warriors earn higher expected
incomes than producers.
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In the short run, population and hence production are xed. Therefore, an increase in the
warriorsshare of the crop will immediately increase the warriorsexpected income, and will reduce
the producersexpected income. In the long run, however, population growth will inevitably bring
the expected incomes back to their original level. The agreed division of the crop, captured by
parameter , cannot a¤ect incomes in the long run.
The ratio yws=yps gives us a measure of the equilibrium degree of income inequality:
ywj
ypj
=
w
p
: (42)
Observe that the equilibrium degree of income inequality is increasing in the relative cost of warrior
children, while the agreed division of the crop has no e¤ect. This means that the share of the
product taken by the warrior elite has no permanent impact on income inequality. In the model,
the source of income inequality is purely demographic.
From equations (31) and (32) we obtain the societys equilibrium class composition:
MPR =
Nwj
Npj
=

1  

w
p
 1
: (43)
Following Andreski (1968, 33), we will refer to ratio Nwj=Npj as the societys military participation
ratio, or MPR. As it is natural, the MPR is increasing in the warriorsshare of the crop:
@ lnMPR
@ ln 
=
1
1   : (44)
Since  2 (0; 1), this elasticity is greater than one.
An increase in the relative cost of warrior children will reduce the MPR and sharpen income
inequality in favour of warriors:
@ lnMPR
@ ln (w=p)
=  1; (45)
@ ln(ywj=ypj)
@ ln (w=p)
= 1: (46)
This result is consistent with the main stylised fact detected by Andreski: increases in the cost of
weapons and military training tend to reduce the MPR and to increase the economic advantage
of warriors (Andreski 1968, 4041, 73). Andreski provides historical examples from a wide array
of civilisations (pp. 3972). We reproduce three of his examples to give the reader a taste of the
historical evidence.
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Persia In the times of the Achaemenid Empire, the Persian army consisted of nobles and
freemen. The MPR was high since the freemen were very numerous. Most of the army battled
on foot, supported by a minimal cavalry. The main weapons in use were the bow and the long
spear. Protective armour was scanty and uncommon. When the Sassanid dynasty rose to power in
the third century A.D., it introduced a series of e¤ective but very expensive military innovations;
most importantly, the stirrup and heavy protective armour. As a result, the freemen disappeared,
the warrior nobility shrank while its privileges expanded, and the peasants were reduced to harsh
servitude (pp. 4647).
Poland The original Polish kingdom was despotic. Freemen and the kings personal guard,
the Druzhina, comprised the army. Both groups were armed with primitive weapons and did not
wear body armour. Gradually, the army incorporated more advanced equipment. Heavily armed
horsemen were the mainstay of the Polish forces that repelled the Teutonic Knights in Grünewald
(1410 AD). The modernisation of the army was accompanied by a reduction of the MPR and an
increase in social inequalities: peasants were reduced to the status of serfs, and military service was
restricted to the nobility (pp. 5960).
England The Norman conquest of England, which introduced heavy cavalry to the country,
sharpened social inequalities relative to the preceding Anglo-Saxon period. This process began to
be reversed during the wars against the Welshmen, when English warriors learned how to use the
long bow. An inexpensive yet formidable weapon, the long bow was far superior to any other type
of bow. In combination with cavalry, it was able to inict enormous damage on enemy forces.
The adoption of the long bow forced profound changes in military tactics and organisation. As a
consequence of these changes, serfdom virtually disappeared from England, yeomen thrived, the
MPR increased and social inequality became much less pronounced (pp. 6465).
3.2.2 Privileges
In the equilibrium, the warriorsand producersutilities at birth are given by
uwj =
 1w 

w
(1  ) ; (47)
upj =
 1p 

p
(1  ) ; (48)
which follows from equations (12), (15), (29), and (30).
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Using the equilibrium levels of utility at birth we can build a measure of the warriorsdegree of
privilege:
uwj
upj
=

w
p
 1
| {z }
?1


w
p

| {z }
>1
? 1; (49)
since  > 1,  > 0, w > p > 0, and w; p > 0.
If warriors face a higher risk of death than producers (i.e., if w < p), the warriors degree
of privilege could be lower than one, which means that the producers would be the privileged
class. This is possible, but unlikely, as warrior children would probably shun the military career.
Some form of compulsion or indoctrination would thus be required to keep the warrior elite from
disbanding. If, on the contrary, warriors enjoy more utility than producers, coercion may be needed
to enforce property rights or, in extremis, to prevent a revolution. This is probably why many
warrior nobilities kept the commoners disarmed. Before the westernisation of Japan, for example,
the bearing of arms was a strict prerogative of the nobles (with the very brief exception of the
Taikwa reforms period during the 7th century). No peasant rebellion ever succeeded in Japan
(Andreski 1958, 50).
Some authors suggest mechanisms that would allow a privileged upper class to subsist without
coercing the lower classes. For example, if groups are segregated and investments in human capital
generate positive externalities within groups, then individual choices may lead to self-perpetuating
economic di¤erences between groups (Lundberg and Startz 1998). In addition, upper-class pro-
paganda could deceive the lower classes into believing that economic inequalities are in their best
interest (Cronk 1994; DeMarrais et al. 1996). If people tend to be inuenced by members of their
own social classes, lower-class people could just learn to play their disadvantaged role in society
without questioning (Henrich and Boyd 2008). Yet another possibility is that the network structure
of a society may impede the formation of lower-class coalitions that could force a redistribution of
wealth (Kets et al. 2011).
3.2.3 Benets and costs of stratication
In our model, the existence of a warrior elite impinges in various ways on the productive class. On
the one hand, the elite performs useful social functions: it expands and defends the frontiers of
society, and it provides public goods that enhance the productivity of the land. On the other hand,
the elite creams o¤ a substantial share of food production for its own use.
Getting rid of the elite will produce redistributive gains for the productive class. However, the
lack of warriors could reduce the military power of the society, exposing it to predation from other
societies. Productivity may also fall as the organisational and intellectual skills of the elite are lost.
The net impact on the producersliving standards will depend on the relative magnitude of these
various e¤ects.
19
As an illustration, consider the following thought experiment. A stratied society has reached
its long-run equilibrium. One day, the producers revolt against the elite and kill all the warriors.
For simplicity, assume that the revolution does not impose any direct costs on producers, and no
producer is killed during the revolution.
Before the revolution, the income of the average producer was
ypj =
(1  )AsN1 pj
Npj
 
(Nwj)

L0
(Nwj)

+ P j
!
: (50)
After the revolution, the income of the average producer is
y0pj =
AeN
1 
pj
Npj
 
NpjL0
Npj + P j
!
: (51)
To facilitate the math, assume that Society j is small in comparison to the aggregate of the other
societies. This means that
ypj 
(1  )AsN1 pj
Npj
 
(Nwj)

L0
P j
!
: (52)
y0pj 
AeN
1 
pj
Npj
 
NpjL0
P j
!
: (53)
Note the di¤erences between ypj and y0pj . First, TFP falls from As to Ae, because the public goods
provided by the warriors are no longer available after the revolution. Second, the military power of
the society changes from (Nwj)
 to Npj , since the non-professional militia does not use specialised
weapons. Third, the term 1  disappears from the expression, because the warriors no longer take
a fraction  of the total food production.
The ratio ypj=y0pj gives us a measure of the net social contribution of the warrior elite:
SCW =
ypj
y0pj
= (1  )As
Ae

Nwj
Npj

: (54)
Combining equations (43) and (54), we obtain the equilibrium value of SCW:
SCW =  (1  )1  As
Ae

w
p
 
: (55)
If SCW is greater than unity, social stratication provides a net benet for producers. However,
if SCW is less than unity, social stratication harms the producers. It is reasonable to think that, all
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else being equal, the probability of a revolt will be lower the larger the net benets of stratication,
or the smaller its net harm.
Observe that the social benets of stratication are increasing in the e¤ectiveness of the spe-
cialised weapons, and in the technological advantage of stratied societies, which is given by As=Ae.
Also, the benets are decreasing in the relative cost of warrior children, since a fall in the cost of
warrior children allows a society to nance a larger army.
The warriorsshare of the crop, denoted by , has an ambiguous e¤ect on the social benets of
stratication. Log-di¤erentiating SCW with respect to  we get
@ lnSCW
@ ln 
=
   
1   ; (56)
which will be positive if and only if  < .
The source of this ambiguity is the following. On the one hand, a high  implies that getting rid
of the warriors will liberate large quantities of food to be distributed among the current generation
of producers. On the other hand, getting rid of the warriors will alter the military power of the
society. If  is large, the societys MPR will be large before the revolution. Thus, the militia
formed after the revolution will be less powerful than the army which it replaces. The societys
neighbours will take advantage of this weakness, capturing land from the emancipated producers.
Food production will su¤er from the loss of land. In the end, the producersincome may be even
lower than before the revolution.
The previous analysis assumes that social structures come in two extreme types: egalitarian
societies armed with primitive weapons, and stratied societies armed with advanced weapons. In
practice, a variety of hybrid social structures is conceivable. In many premodern societies, a core of
elite warriors was supplemented by cheaply equipped professional soldiers or a citizen militia. This
practice reached its zenith in Ancient Greece, whose city-states relied heavily on part-time armies
of citizen farmers (Gat 2006, 310). Note, however, that Greek city-states were not very egalitarian
by modern standards, since they typically included a slave population who performed many of the
menial and manual tasks.
The possibility of hybrid social structures, such as that of the Greek city-states, implies that
SCW only sets up an upper bound for the social contribution of warriors. Nevertheless, this fact
does not invalidate the comparative statics that follows from the previous analysis. Even if the
social contribution of warriors turns out to be negative, increases in SCW should make a revolution
less likely.
There is also the possibility that the emancipated producers are able to perform the functions
of the displaced warrior elite. The producers could in theory raise taxes to train and equip some
members of their own class to serve as professional soldiers and administrators. In this case, the
newly formed egalitarian society would retain the use of specialized weapons and the public goods
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provided by the warrior elite before the revolution. However, taking over the functions of the warrior
elite also imposes costs on society. Reallocating some producers to military and administrative tasks
will reduce production. In addition, the taxes will further reduce the producersper capita income.
The taxes will be higher the higher the cost of training and equipping soldiers and administrators.
Moreover, the possibility exists that the appointed soldiers mount a coup and subjugate the rest
of the population. To reduce the likelihood of a coup, the egalitarian society may have to restrict
the size of its army, which will reduce the e¤ectiveness of the army in its o¤ensive and defensive
functions. In sum, the producers will have to consider all these costs when they decide whether or
not to rebel against the warrior elite.
In our model, the role of the warrior elite is similar to that of the kingin Grossman (2002). In
his model, a privileged elite provides a public service whose benets to the rest of the population
outweigh the cost of supporting the elite. There are, however, two di¤erences between our model
and Grossmans. In Grossmans model, the elite defends producers against internal predators who
would otherwise steal part of their output. In our model, the elite defends producers against external
predators and increases the productivity of the land. A second di¤erence concerns the duration
of the benets. In Grossmans model, the policing activities of the elite ensure a permanently
higher standard of living for producers, whereas in our model endogenous population growth will
eventually bring the producersstandard of living back to the subsistence level.
In a related paper, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) model the transition from a non-democratic
society controlled by a rich elite to a democracy. They nd that the poor will threaten to revolt
when the cost of revolting is low; for example, during recessions. This threat may force the elite to
democratise. On the other hand, the redistributive nature of democratic regimes may encourage
the elite to mount a coup. The more unequal the distribution of resources, the more likely it is that
society will end up oscillating between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Unlike our model,
Acemoglu and Robinsons model does not account for the e¤ects of demographic forces.
4 Concluding remarks
In our model, equilibrium requires that the number of warriors and the number of producers remain
constant through time. Thus, per capita incomes must be just enough to ensure that the average
member of each social class (taking into account individuals who die before reproducing) has exactly
one child. Since warrior children are more costly than producer children, the per capita income
of warriors must be higher than the per capita income of producers. Otherwise, warriors would
choose to have too few children, and the ratio of warriors to producers would fall. Warriors use
part of their higher income to train and equip their children for war, and part to nance their own
superior level of consumption. If the relative cost of warrior children increases, the warriors will
require even higher incomes to induce them to reproduce at the same rate as producers. As a result,
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income inequality will increase. The new equilibrium will be achieved through changes in warrior
and producer populations. The warrior population will decline to increase their per capita income.
Conversely, the producer population will grow to reduce their per capita income. It follows that
the military participation ratio (MPR) must fall if the relative cost of warrior children increases.
In order to increase its realism, our model could be extended in various ways.
The assumption of strict social immobility could be relaxed, allowing warriors to father children
who move down the social scale in later life. This extension is important because di¤erential
reproduction is a form of social inequality (Betzig 1986).
The ecology of stratied and egalitarian societies could also be analysed. A natural way would
be to integrate our model with some existing ecological model. The Ideal Despotic Distribution
Model would be a natural choice (Bell and Winterhalder 2011; Kennett and Winterhalder 2008;
Kennett et al. 2009; Winterhalder et al. 2010).
In our model, we examine how the given land area is divided up between egalitarian and stratied
societies, but in doing so the number of each type of society is taken as given. An extended model
with an ecological component could be used to explore the processes by which societies rise and
fall, and the mechanisms by which one type of society replaces another. For example, as stratied
societies grow larger, they use their military power to seize the most productive lands, pushing
egalitarian societies into increasingly marginal ecological niches (Scott 2010, 39). Our model
could be extended so that stratied societies deliberately try to expand into their neighboursmost
productive lands. In the extended model, a minor improvement in weapons technology might
eventually transform into a big military advantage. Initially, a stratied society would use its
improved weaponry to capture from its egalitarian neighbours a small area of their best land.
Production from this extra land would used by the stratied society to sustain a bigger army.
Meanwhile, the defeated egalitarian societies would lose some of their population, no longer able to
produce enough food to sustain it. Consequently, the military superiority of the stratied society
would increase. The stratied society would then take advantage of its increased superiority to
capture its neighbours second-best land, igniting a chain reaction in which the stratied society
becomes ever larger and more powerful, and egalitarian societies ever smaller and weaker. The
chain reaction will come to an end only when a hypertrophied stratied society is surrounded by
many small egalitarian societies, each conned to an area of low fertility soil.
Finally, the model could be extended to endogenise the social norms and institutions that
provide structure to stratied societies, beginning with the class system itself. Militarism, hereditary
nobility and primogeniture could also be endogenised. A plausible mechanism for the emergence
of these norms and institution is group selection. According to some authors, group selection can
explain the evolution of many individual behaviours that improve the tness of the society, even
if those behaviours are costly at the personal level (see, for instance, Bowles et al. 2003, Henrich
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2004, and van den Bergh and Gowdy 2009). The spread of social stratication, despite its social
injustices, may have been an endogenous evolutionary response to intersocietal competition.
A Derivation of the mathematical results
A.1 Derivation of equations (23) and (24)
Log-derivating both sides of equation (21) we get
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
= 1 + 
@ lnLi
@ lnAi
+ (1  ) @ lnNpi
@ lnAi
: (57)
Analogously, log-derivating both sides of equation (22) we get
@ lnLi
@ lnAi
= 
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
 
@ ln

Npi + P i

@ lnAi
: (58)
But, from the chain rule we know that
@ ln [f (x)]
@ ln x
=
x
f (x)
@f (x)
x
: (59)
Applying this identity in equation (58) we obtain
@ lnLi
@ lnAi
= 
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
  N

pi
Npi + P i
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
: (60)
From this result and denitions (1) and (3), it follows that
@ lnLi
@ lnAi
= 
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
   Li
L0
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
: (61)
Equations (57) and (61) form a linear system for the elasticities of Npi and Li with respect to
Ai. The solutions of this system are
@ lnNpi
@ lnAi
=
L0
 [(1  )L0 + Li] ; (62)
@ lnLi
@ lnAi
=
 (L0   Li)
 [(1  )L0 + Li] ; (63)
as we set out to prove.
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A.2 Derivation of equations (34), (35) and (36)
Log-di¤erentiating both sides of equations (31), (32) and (33) with respect to Aj we get
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
= 1 + 
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
+ (1  ) @ lnNpj
@ lnAj
; (64)
@ lnNpj
@ lnAj
= 1 + 
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
+ (1  ) @ lnNpj
@ lnAj
; (65)
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
= 
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
 
@ ln
h
(Nwj)

+ P j
i
@ lnAj
: (66)
But, from the chain rule we know that
@ ln [f (x)]
@ ln x
=
x
f (x)
@f (x)
@x
: (67)
Applying this identity in equation (66) we obtain
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
= 
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
   (Nwj)

L0
(Nwj)

+ P j
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
: (68)
From this result and denitions (1) and (3), it follows that
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
= 
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
  Lj
L0
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
; (69)
Equations (64), (65) and (69) form a linear system for the elasticities of Nwj , Npj and Lj with
respect to Aj . The solutions of this system are
@ lnNwj
@ lnAj
=
L0
 [(1  )L0 + Lj ] ; (70)
@ lnNpj
@ lnAj
=
L0
 [(1  )L0 + Lj ] (71)
@ lnLj
@ lnAj
=
 (L0   Lj)
 [(1  )L0 + Lj ] : (72)
as we set out to prove.
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A.3 Derivation of condition (37)
For an arbitrary egalitarian Society i, equations (2), (21) and (22) imply that
Npi =
(1  )AeLi N1 pi
p
; (73)
Li =
NpiL0PM
k=1 Pk
: (74)
Together, these equations yield
N
(1 )
pi =
(1  )Ae
p
 
L0PM
k=1 Pk
!
: (75)
For an arbitrary stratied Society j, equations (31), (75) and (33) imply that
Nwj =
(1  ) AsLjN1 pj
w
; (76)
Npj =
(1  ) (1  )AsLjN1 pj
p
; (77)
Lj =
(Nwj)

L0PM
k=1 Pk
: (78)
Together, these equations yield
(Nwj)
(1 )
=
 (1  ) As
w
 

1  

w
p
 1! (1 ) 
L0PM
k=1 Pk
!
: (79)
From (75) and (79) it follows that

Nwj
Npi
(1 )
=  (1  )1  As
Ae

w
p
 
(80)
The stratied society will be more powerful that the egalitarian society if Nwj > Npi, and hence
if the right-hand side of the above equation is greater than unity. This will be the case if
 (1  )1  As
Ae
>

w
p

;
as we set out to prove.
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